According to Evans et al. ( 2015 ), “ self-regulation is the ability to control one’s thoughts, emotions, and behaviors by overriding a dominant response. “ Baumeister & Vohs ( 2016 ) defined it as “ a process by which the self intentionally alters its own responses based on standards. “  Carver and Scheier, ( 1982 ), said, “ self-regulation is the whole system of standards, thoughts processes, and actions that guide people’s behaviour towards desired end states.”

A large body o research pertaining to self-regulation ( SR ) can be found in Control Theory. Many research teams consider Control Theory a model of self-regulation and multiple fields have been impacted by this theory, for example  “ engineering “ ( e.g. Dransfield, 1968; Berkovitz, 1974; Davis, 1977 ), “ economics “ ( e.g. Balakrishnan, 1973; Pindyck, 1973, and “ medicine “ ( e,g, Guyton, 1976 ). Control processes are ubiquitous, identifiable in virtually any sort of self-regulating system.

While the definition of self-regulation remains a work in progress, there is also more than a little ambiguity over the differences between self-control and self-regulation. The terms have been conflated by research teams for at least the last two decades. Gillebaart, M., ( 2018 ) has recently attempted to disentangle this conundrum, “ The difference between self-regulation and self-control is that self-regulation allows people to formulate goals, standards,  and desired end states between one’s current state and these desired end states.”

Adding to the nomenclature, Gillebaart, M. ( 2018 ), states, “ self-regulation involves the entire scaffolding for successful goal pursuit “, to sum it up, Gillebaart explains, “ self-regulation can be defined as the whole system of standards, processes, and actions that guide people’s behavior toward desired end states. These end states can be long-term goals or refer to standards and norms. “ Baumeister & Vohs, ( 2016 ) also found, “ self-regulation relies on a limited resource. “ Gillebaart, M. ( 2018 ). The Operational definition of self-control.

Self-regulation failure has been defined in early research as a response to the influence of reward, ( i.e. cue reactivity and lapse activated consumption ), and later explained by research pointing to the influence of the prefrontal cortex ( Heatherton, Todd,  Wagner, & Dillon, 2011 ). Cognitive neuroscience of self-regulation failure

Baumeister and Heatherton, ( 1996 ), established the importance of paying attention to information input. “ Managing attention would be important in many or all spheres of self-regulation. And as a corollary, the loss of attentional control will be a common first harbinger of self-regulatory failure. “

Research has shown greater distress observed in children who use fewer emotional regulation strategies, strategies including social engagement, self-distraction, or self-soothing ( Weinberg and Tronick, 1994; Grolnick et al. 1996; Diener & Mangelsdorf, 1999; Myruski, S. Et al., 2019 ). Neural signatures of child cognitive emotion regulation are bolstered by parental social regulation in two cultures.

One justified criticism about self-regulation failure research is, “ Researchers have generally neglected to consider situational factors that influence the balance between activity in subcortical regions and the prefrontal cortex in self-regulation failure. Heatherton et al., ( 2017 ) Cognitive Neuroscience of Self-Regulation Failure.A similar observation would apply to parental alienation theory.

Heatherton et al ( 2011 ) confirmed that SR failure also occurs “ when frontal executive functions are compromised by an injury. “ Baumeister  & Vohs ( 2016 ) found, “ chronic depletion can impair SR to an extent it does not bounce back after a healthy meal  and a good night’s sleep. “  Evans et al ( 2015 ) suggests,  “ to build a more comprehensive understanding of SR fatigue and SR failures, we need to also integrate possible neurobiological underpinnings of physical and self-regulatory fatigue. “

Self-regulation fatigue differs from self-regulation failure. In the history of the strength model, self-regulation failure began to be described as a process of energy depletion, analogous to muscle fatigue, Evans et al., ( 2015 ). The early accounts of self-regulation failure were attributed to acquiescence. Later came a shift in theory to the glucose depletion hypothesis, but this explanation could not account for the ability of psychological factors such as beliefs and motivation to override fatigue, even when the levels of fatigue was substantial. In summary, Evans et al. ( 2015 ) concluded, findings of the domain of physical fatigue suggest that self-regulatory fatigue can be understood  only  by considering both physiological and psychological factors, not just one or the other.

In research related to feelings of fatigue, exerting self-control can result in both mental and physiological debility. The first integrated theory by Noakes, ( 1997 ), proposed there must be a central nervous system mechanism, a central governor, ( CG ), that limits further exertion to prevent homeostatic breakdown. The central governor theory is based on the premise muscle fatigue is not a physical event defined by a reduction in muscle force output and caused by peripheral events such as a lack of energetic substrate, but rather a subjective feeling analogous to an emotion whose function is to maintain homeostasis and direct behavior to protect the organism. Nokes et al., ( 2005 ). There is also research that supports the presence of a central governor in the anterior insula ( IA ), Evans et al ( 2016 )

The central governor, or CG, is a process in the brain that regulates exercise in regard to a normally calculated safe exertion by the body’s homeostasis by causing anoxic damage to the heart muscle. The CG restricts glucose so as to conserve, and it does so without knowing precisely how much is available, operating instead on the basis of an implicit budget that seems to keep daily glucose use from outstripping consumption, such as by freely expending available new glucose, but only reluctantly dipping into stores.

The central governor uses all available cues because it does not know how much remains, and moreover, it must be willing to allocate extra glucose in a crisis. The CG does not have the most important information, namely how much glucose exists in storage around the body, so it uses various cues such as information suggesting that willpower is unlimited. Such a belief can override the cues from a modest accumulation of adenosine, indicating that some glucose has been consumed. But as the ashes pile up, the central government pays more attention to that signal than to others. Baumeister and Vohs, ( 2016 ).